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All statutory law may be septfuated into a few main
divi ions.
Among those divisions the legislation relating to
bank<ruptcy and insolvency forms an important part and q
brief survey of the statutory enactments upon these subjects
both in England and America hardly seems inroper at, this
place .
No condition of mankind has perhaps furnished so
abundant field for legislation as have

his misfortunes en-

terprises and the relations growing therefrom.
In the early history of these statutes a distinction
was made between bankrupt md insolvent laws.
The ERnlish bankruptcy system as estpblished by the
earlier statutes was limited in i t s operation to traders; it
was available only to the creditors of the trader and no
means were provided by which the trader could voluntarily
avail himself of its operation; it

did not discharge the

debtor from his debts, the dividends under the comission
be ing considered as payment only protanto.

Later stat-

utes did release the debtor entirely from +,he c! aims of his
creditors but the laws were still available to traders only.

Under this condition of circunstances there still
remained a large class of citizens, not traders, who yet

were engag.d in business enterprises and for whom the law
offeredupon disaster overtaking them in their financial
7 his unprotc ,ed class were still liable

affairs.

not only to be stripped of their property, but also to be
imprisoned for the debts; they were without relief from the
bankrupt laws or from anyother source.
It was to alleviate the necessities of this class
of citizens, not traders,
acted.

that the insolvency laws were en-

These laws did not discharge the debtor from

his debts; they contemplated only a pro rita distribution of
his effects among his creditors, and the immunity of his
person from imprisonment.

Their operation wacl graduall y

extended so as to dischar, :e the debtor from his debts and
finally

to include all classes of failing debtors, and so

+,he two systems of laws were gradually assimilatpd.
t ates the term bankrupt law has been
In the United '-+

applied to enpctments by

Congress under its constitutional

power to legislateppon bankruptcy in general,

while laws

passpd by the stsle le-islarures, whether technically insolvent or bankrupt ,aws, are denoininted insolvent laws.
Th e
di stinction is eo nomine, having, really no vflid g,,round for
its support,

and an historical review of the lePislation

upon the subject will show that a benkrupt law mw contain

regulations g'enerally found in insolvent laws while an insolvent law may contain those common to brnkrupt laws.
Insolvent laws have existed ever since this state
was an independen'-, government,
its

excppt for f brief period in

istoryr
Theyr havP been frequently amended and as oftentimes

repealed,
of

or suspended in their, operation by the existence

Federal ban!.-rupt laws,

until it

may be said that at the

present time the legislation in this state upon the subject
is comprehended in what are known, as the two thirds act, the
seventy da;r act, the fourteen day act, anA the general
assignment act.
The last in particular is deserving
of our attention in this connection.
Assignments for the benefit of creditors although
analogous to the relief afforded by the legis ation above
mentimed form no part of, nor do. they trace their beginning
to, such statutes.

'"hey are of common law growth and

all statutory law upon such conveyances merely reco,nizes
their existence by prescribing rules for their creation and
safeguards Pa.:inst their abuse.
Our courts seem to have
ly American in their

regarded them as peculiar-

tructure anA as of recent origin, but

4.

early English cases are to be found in which assinnments for
the benefit of creditors practically existed- although they
were termed acts of bankruptcy.
They are not creatures of statute, nor do they
come into being by operation of law or by force of any previous proceedings either by or q.,ainst the debtor.

They are

purely voluntary acts like contracts an,-, rest like all contracts upon the ass-ent of the parties.
Their primary object is to afford a speedy anA economical rie.hod o,' distrihuting the debtor's estate among
those creditors justly entitled thereto, and at the same
time to place such property beyond the direct pursuit of
creditors, by a converpance in trust for them.
They do not relieve the debtor from the payment of
his debts the payments made by his assig[nee being only pro
tanto, the debtor still remaining liable +,o kegal process as
before.

Although the practice is viewed by the courts

with the most extreme jealously, the debtor may at common
law make preferences among his creditors, upon the principle
that it is not a fraud for a man to pay one creditor his debt
in full and at, the same neglect to satisfy the claims of his
remaining creditors; that such a -privile[-e exii'ting prior to
his insolvency is not removed by his subsequently becoming unable to piy all of his debts in full.

A vaid assiprnment must be a

conveyance of the

dobtor's property in trust, to sell such asdigned yrp'erty
and to distribute the proceeds among creditoi's.
VOID }flR

TON-cOPLIACE TO STATUTE.

The existence of vuluntary asSignments for the benefit of creditors was fully recognized, and the peneral requisites essential to their validity established, prior to
any statutory enactments in this state.
Owing to the vague and incomplete rules laid 'Sown
by the courts in regard to the creation an d

fulfilment of

such trusts great fqcilities were furnished for faudulent am
and dishonest acts by the parties thereto, hence it was rende'red necessary that there should be some explicit statutory
regulations upon the subject an
186o was enacted.

accordingly the statute of

This was subsequently superseded by

what is known as the (eneral Assignment Act, (,.
466.)

1877, ch.,

This act with its various amendments comprise our

statutorr! provisions upon the subject.
Perhaps one of the most frequent of causes for the
settingp aside of an as:ignment for 3rounds apparent upon its
face arises from the failure to comply wth the statutory
regulations just mentioned.
As to what portions of these statutes are merely
dir't,orxr or

ffirmative, an'

what are mandatory in their

character,

has from the very beginning afforded opportunity

for much dispute and the qdjudicitions thnereupon arp extremely multifarious.

It is quite unecessary to mwi*

enter into discussion

of the earlier of those crses as the later decisions of our
248;

courts,( Warner v. Jaffray 96 N.Y.
105 N.Y. I.;

Bloomingdale v.

Nicoll v.

eligman 3 N.Y.

Spowers

Supp. 241, ('or.

Pleas N.Y. city, Dec., 3, 1888. ) seem to have somewhat essentially modified those rulings an' quite clearly established
the law upon the question.
Prior to those decisions it
uniformily settled that

seems to have been quite

the statute had been sufficiently

complied with if the as-ignment was in writing-, duly acknowlged, assented to by the assignee in writing anA duly recorded; that all other parts o' the statute, such as those requiringp- the fil iny of schedules or the -ivin-, of a bond, were
merely directory, non-compliance with the same not being considered a cause for invalidattny( the assignnent itself.
Hardman v. Bowen 39 N.Y. 196.
Rennie v. Bean

24 Hun

12;.

The case of Warner v. Jaffray,supra, modifies the
proposition above stated by holding that the record of the
assinment is unecessary to its vatlidity.

Earl J., pave

252 says of the assignment : "It must be in writing and

thp assignee mustaasent thereto in writing and when it has
thus becn executed and delivered i+, takes effect and the
title to the property passes to the a ssignee.

All other

requirments subsequent to the execution and delivery of the
assi;,(nment are merely directory and there is ample power in
the courts to enforce their" observance.'
Subsequent to the decision in thet case the legislature ampnded the general assignment act by edJing, ch.,294
L.1888., which requires in adition to those essentials already stated,that the -ssignment

state the residence of the

bbtor, his business, and if in a city, his street and number.
Upon this amenrnent arose the fete case of, Bloomingdale v.
Sel iman, supra.

The court in that case held the ass-

i; r~nt invalid - r failing to comply with the recent amendment.

It would accordingly seem from the most recent decisions that an assignment will nothset aside for non-compliance to the statute unless it

fails to conform to the

p rovis-

ion o" the statute- in one of the four particulars already
mentioned
-- PROVISIONS TKiVD!NG TO DFIAY.-Under the statute of frauds any conveyance made with
the intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, is void.

At first thought s ch hindrance or delay would seem
to be the natural result of all assignments for the benefit
of creditors.
ment, even if

Certainly it must

be true of every assig'n-

the creditors are to be paid pari passu, that

they a,'e to some extent ki±Mdn hindered or delayed in the
collection of their debts.

This objection, if it be one, is

overthrown by the facts, that the debtor has in good faith
dedicated all of his property to the paymeont of his debts,
which, in cases especially where preferences qre absent,is
all tbht the a editors hqve any right to expect and all that
the law ought to exact; and also that

kI kim whatever delay

or hinderance there may be present is

nerely incidental to

the creation and execution of the trust.
Such delay however, must be

only incidental and

necessary to the fulfillment of the trust or the execution of
the power.

When it

becomes more than thnt, when from

the intent of the assignor as evinced by the ins t rument it,.
self and the surrounding circunstances,

delay and hinderance

to creditors are the primary objects to be accomplished by
the a'eation of the trust, then such ass ignment is unquestionably void.
Nicholson v. Leavitt

6N.Y.

510 -16-17.

Such intent to hLnder and delay may be apparent
from the face of the assignment itself or it

may be evinced

from the surrounding facts and circumstances.
It is here purposed to treat of those instances in
wh ch the face of the assinment furnishes sufficient evidence o" such fraudulent intent.
-- PROVISIONS IN FAVOR OF AcqI(NOR.-The very large number oP cases in which assignments
have been held invalidhave for the most part arisen from an
aii-empt on the part of the 4raughtsman to reserve some form
of benefit to the assignor.
An assignment f+or the benefit of creditors is a
conveyance the very nature of which is to devote the whole
of an insolvent debtor s property to the payment of his debts.
It operates to place such debtors property beyond the reach
of creditor s by a legral process.
If

such a convey;rance should be allowed, in view of

those facts, to either expressely or impliedly create

trust

in favor of the assignor the very result thereby ,attained
would defeat the purpose of making assignments.

Such a

trust would be o palpalble fraud upon creditors.

The wary

c'editor would be powerless, while others would be deprived
of a ratable distribution of the whole of the debtor's property, and by his own fraudulent act such assignor might safely retain for himself that belonging in equity and jushtice
to his creditors.

I0.

There can be no question :ut tiat any assignment of
the whole of the debtor's property which contains a trust
for, or reserves any benefit out of such assigned Lroerty
to, such insolvent, debtor, is unqualifiedly void.
This doctrine is explicitly and clearly stated in
the holding in

PJackie v. Cairns,5 Cowen 547, a case argued

in 1825 in the COurt for the Correction of Frrors.

The

decision is a leading and aithoritative one upon this question, and has been repeatedly ap ,roved in respect to the point
under cons deration, by the sur,)sequent decisions of the courtaf
of this state.

In the course of his opinion in that case,
savac-e, page 580,

ch.,J.

said : "When a debtor fails, either from

misfortune of folly, or from dishonest motives, his pro1 erty
in moral justice belongs to his creditors.

He is permitt-

ed. to prefer in payment such creditors as he pleases.
This is

iving him power enough - but when he ap!,ropriates

the property to his own use the qct becomles fraudulent.
Nor does it lie in his power to prescribe terms to his creditors.

The law is open to them.

They have a right to

pursue the debtor in the mode pointed by law and qny act
which obstructs them in their pursuit is

against the law and

of course void, unless such act appropria 4;es the property to
the payment of debts.

"

II.

Is
state ma/r b

it

law that Pver,

amigninp: all his property in t,.rust,

himself an allowknce of :,2000 a
his own property ?

r1o

in this
secure to

year, or any o t her sum from

state sch a proposition is

ficient refutation o-f it.
it

insolvent debtor

It

, suf-

offends the moral sense -

shocks the conscience and produces an

exclaration.

"

There exi o:.t-s considerable conflict qimon , the c-.ses,
as to thp reasons for invalidating such assignments,

some

authorities holding them void because in conflict with that
portion of the satute

o-

frads, declaring all transfers,

sales and assignments, in trust for the use of the person making, the s ne,
subsequent.

to be void as agrainst creditors existing an4
Other equally reliable authorities hold

that such stntute has no application to assigippents for the
bnnefit of creditors but ony that such assi 'nments in those
ins')Pnces are void for
any event it
is

ac t ual fraud.

Reingv void in

is here immaterial as to which line of decisions

superior in authority .
Where the assignment is

of all the debtors property

for the benefit of a portion of the creritors only, and an
express reservation of the surplus to the assignor such
reservation will avoid the assignment.
,outherland

v.

Bradner

39 Hun 134.

If however the assignment be of all the debtors

12.

pro})erty for the benefit of all of his creditors such reservation would result in no hirm for it would only be an expression in the instrument of what must in such a case necessarily occur by operation of law, u p on the full an

complete

liquidation of the claims of his creditors.
A reservation of such property as is by law exempt
from levy and sale by execution will not invalidate the
assignment,

since the creditors are not hindered by the

.'r.

fHxE debtor's retaining that which they had no right to
touch.

This proposition seems to be wellby afthorities

in the various states.
Muhr's Sons v. Pinover 9 Cent. >{ep. 67,
and cases cited.
The assignment is not void by reason of the failure
of the debtor to convey all of his property, but rather by
ipason of his reservation of some part of the property conveyed.
The debtor may except a portion of his property from
the xxx±ipm

the operation of the assignment since as the

title to such portion has never passed it

remains in his

hands open to the pursuit of creditors as if no assignment
had been made and their remedies arainst it

have never been

hindered or delayed.
Carpenter v. Underwood 19 N.Y. 520.

13.

A provision in an assig'nment, which provides for the
payment of future advances to the assignor out of the proceeds of the asi:ned pr operty, or

for the liquidation of

-

future liabilities which the assignee may assume for such
debtor in preference or to the exclusion of debts due to
creditors contracted prior to such assignment, is - sufficient
ground for setting the assignment a iide.

Such an attem-

pt to secure future benefit or credit to the assignor will
not be sustained.

But a provision authorizing the

assignee to pay, "debts due or to grow due" is unobjectionable
if itappear that such debts only were referred to as were in
actual existence at the time of making

the assignment wheth-

er mptured or yet to mature.

is perhaps unecess-

It

ary to add that existing contingent liabilities may be protected by a provision to that effect.
Brainerd v. Dunning 30 N.Y. 211.
Bank of Silver Creek v. Talcott 22 Barb.55
An assigmnent containing a provision to the effect
that the assignee shall pay all costs and expenses necessarily incurred by the assi nor in defending suits that might
be in stituted against him b

any creditor or other person for

anything growing out of the assignment, is fraudulent and
will be set aside upon the motion o"' the creditors.
Such a clause is clearly an attempt to reserve to

14.

the assi.,nor some benefit from the assigrunent and if upheld
would enable the debtor to drive his creditors into almost
any terms of compi.omise
As said by the Vice Chancellor in Mead v. Phillips
I

Andf.

Ch. 8".,

"It

is standing notice to all creditors

that any attempt which theY may mal-e to question the amount
due to them or to others as stated in the assignment, or to
compel its execution will be resisted by the debtor; that he
will contest such efforts to the end of the law, ano will
subtract the costs and expenses incu'red by him in Fo doing
from +he fund they are looking' to for a dividend."
More than thht, i

occasion should require the en-

forcemient of such a clause the effect would certainly be to
postpone a distribution for an, indefinite length of time,
t d consequently

the creditor's must thereby be hindered and

delayed in the collection of their debts.

--

PROVISIONS IN FAVOR OF TIE ASSIGNEF.-We have thus far considered those instances in which

provisions securing favor to the assignor hnve afforded just
grounds for the setting aside of an a signment.

We have

foind that such provisions render the assignment void because indicating an intent to hinder and delay creditors in
the enforcenent of their demands.

15.

Upon the same theory of reqsoning the courts heve
ever been ready and almost eager to set aside an aasingment
containing anything in the nature of a provision favor-able
to the assignee.

Provisions favoring the assignee may

of course be of various kinds, but the usual f rm is one in
the nature of an attempt to exempt the assig'nee from liability occurring, "from any loss or injury tu the trust estate
unless the same should he-ppen by reason of his gross neglect
or wilful misfeasance.'
The xmxxkt courts regard such a provision aF a badge
of fraud, and as an attempt by the debtor to hinder and delqy
creditors by exemiting the assignee from a liability imposed
upon him by law.
by a

Even where such

P

provision is succeedd

covenant of the assignee to execute the trust to the

best of his ability and to exercise all the diligence required by virtue of his off'ice a

a trujstee, such former exempt-

ion notwithstanding this amenAment is held to invalidate the
entire instrunent.
Such clauses, it is said,by Sandford J., in Litchfield v. White 2 N.Y. t4

3 Sandf. 553-4,"which in their op-

eration may lead to the waste and loss of the p,'operty, declare an intention on the part of the insolvent debtor to

do-

vote his property to some purpose other than that of the payment of his (ebts.

The assignor is in law deemed to have

P6.

intended all the

consequences which may legitimately flow

from the provisions of such assignments.

The intent to

hinder, delay and defraud thf crelitors becomes a necessary
legal inference from the provis ion under such cir cumstances.
Assignmnents occasionally contain provisions undertaking to secure to the assignee a larger compensation than that
designated by law.

The statutes prescribe the rpte of

commission to be allowed. to the assignee for his services and
any attempt to increase the same will be xnExd regprded as
prejudicial, to the rights of the creditoos and will not be
tol erated.
If the assi, nor selects a member of the legal profe ssion for 9 trustee and inserts in the assivinment a provision authorizing the payment to such assignee of a reasonable counsel fee in addition to his regular cori, ission and
expenses such a provision renders the assignment utterly
void.

The law it

is said makes no distinction between

professional and non-professional assignees, as all Pre expected labor to their utmost capacity for the benefit of the
trust estate an, the fact that one is perhaps better qualifled to act than fnother entitles him to no greater reward
for his superior excellence.
Nichols v. Fecwen 17 N.Y.

22.

7.

--

PPX)VTISON

IN PF}SPIeCT TO THE SALE

OF THE ASSlPW -

RD PROPFRTy.-Creditors are entitled to have thp assigned property
conv~rted into money vrithout any unreasonable delay and -pplied to the payment of their debts.

A provision therefore

in an assignment evincing an intent in the mi mind of the
assist'nor to prevent the imnediate conversion into money of
such property invalidates the asignment as exhibiting an
intent on the part of the assignor to hinder and delay creditors in the collection of their claims.
The rule of construction !n the earlier cases went
so far as to hold a provision imporper which merely made the
time of sale discretionary vi th the aszi -nep, the exercise
of snch discretion bein

limited to a reasonable time.

The

lqter authorities however seem to be more favorable to the
validity of assignqits in this, particular.
Townsend v. Stearns 32 N.Y. 2o9.
It

may be stated as fully settle- that an assignment

containing a provision authorizing the assignor to make sales
of the assigned property upon credit will vitiate the apsignment.
Nicholoson v. Leavit) 6 N.Y. 510.
The insolvent debtor having placed his property beyond the control of his creditors in the hands of t-usteps of

18.

his own selection, vbile pretending to provide for those
creditors, cannot at the same time by authorizing, r sale o-'
the assigned p- operty upon a,edit hinder and delay their right
to have such proyerty converted into cash fo- their benefit.
Whether such

property shall be sold upon credit or not, the

creditors alone have the right to determine.
The construction of the language employed in apsigrn
ments has fiven rise to much discussion as to wh)en an author._ty to sell on credit will be inferred and the rule of construction is well illustrateA in the cases of, Bagley v.
Rowe 105 N.Y. 171; and

Rapalee v. Stewart 27 N.Y. 310.

The languag e of the provision in controversey in the
last case was,"to convert into cash or otherwise dispose of
to the best advantage".

These words ciearly conferred

discretion upon the assignee to dispose of the property
otherwise than for cash and the-,,, were consequently declared
fatal to the valid.ity of the assignment, Emott , J.

saying'

"An authority to do an illegal act is not to be qustained or
overlool'ed because it

may or may not be exercised.

An auth-

ority to do what the law forbids is as fatal a, a 4irection
to do it.
illegal acts.

The law exercises no discretion or control over
We have no _,ight to say that where power is

given to do either a

-mgmk

legal act or In illeval ,sne the

latler is nugatory b cause the discretion to do the one or

I9.

the otber will be controlled by the rules of law and these
will forbid the vi olation of the rights of creditors.
Upon such a principle it
assigr~ient fo

woild be 0ifficult to condemn an
it
anything whichmig'ht contain o+' a permissive

character merely. "
The instrutrnt should contain no provision imposing
a duty upon the afrignee which conflicts with the obligatiois
He is

conferred by law.
erty to sale in

lethally bound to bring the _prop-

a manner most advntageous to the creditors,

which may be either at public auction or K/ private sale,

k

hence a restriction in the ass -iprnment limiting the mode of
sale to the one or +,he o'her might xidx render the assignment voidespecially when taken in connection with other circumstnces,it is

apparent tbat the evident object of the tran-

saction was to coerce or l

xRmknx persuade the creditors

into a settlement.
Hart et al.

v. Crane 7 Paige Ch.

Work v. Ellis 50 Barb.

[Z 37.

512.

-- PROVISIONS FOR NURSING TIE E 'PATF.-M,.Iay a failing, debtor provide by his assignment for
the continuance of his rbusiness by the assignee ?
Such a provision if

made with honest intentions , to

the eff Pct that the assigrnee shall use up material on hand

20.

and finish partially MRs.nufactured goods wotld certainly at
first

+thouight and perhaps

unobjectionable.

It

1.-ith good reason be considered

is indispuIabie thnt the creditors

would realize more from the estste

: if

the materials on

hand could be wo.'Ired up, an,' partially finished .(oods completed

that they would if

the business shot id 'e

immediately

closed up by the assignee in the incomrlete and unfinished
condition in which it

wa- conveyed to him by t.he -usignor.

Surely it would seem that thhe ass ie-nment might provide for
that

which The law itself wo ,ld compel,

for it will not

be denied that in the absence of such a provision thp court
would order the x±kmx assignee to continue the business
it
with a view to closing # up profitkably for the creditors
The early case of Cunningham v. Freeborn II Wend.
241 held such a provision for the continuance of the assigned
business to be proper and thougrh

the decision has since been

overuled by the 7:. Court o' Appeals in this statp yet it posesses some considerable aiount of reason an

is still follow-

ed by courts of the higest resort in some other states.
The bette)r and more logical doctrine it

"otild seem

is to be found in Dunham v. Waterman P7 N.Y. 9, where Such a
provision is held to invalidate the assigTmient.

;he prin-

ciple there asserted is +'at the dpbtor can authorize no

21.

delay wlatever,

except that incident and necessary tot hp cre-

ation of thP trust.

Because of that princip~le, pr(,visions

authorizinl, sales of the assigned property iipon credit and
n1-nerous other prov sions are not to be tolerated.

The ar-

giument use] against such sales is certainly valid when direceA
against, a provision for the continuance
businesq by the assi;<ner.

of the assig'ned

As to the position that by such

a provision the situation of the cr'rditors would be improved
and that what the co;.rt woild order an assignee to do, he
mi ;ht be expressely authorized to do by the a-signment,
Selden J.,

in that case said, "that such a provision overlooks

the dis ttinction between a duty imposed by *nl
ferred b,f an individual.

The first would be

entire control of the courts.

If

a power conunder the

an assignee shavld err

in the exercise of that legal discretion incident to his trust
k

the courts on application could correct the error.

If the sale of the assigned property was unreasonably delayed
the corts coild hasten it.

Not so however in respect to a

dimcretionary power expressely vested in him by the assignment.

Nothing short of frau1 or want of good faith in the

exercise of such a power would authorize the courts to interfere."
The doctrine in the case of Dunham v. WAterman,

is

to be carefully dicstingvuished from the holding of the late

22.

case of Robbin v. Butcher 104 N.Y. 575.
In that case the assignment contained a provision
to the effect,'that should it,be necessary to the better performance of the trust that the party of the second part shall
have full power and authority to finish such work as is unfinished."

The assignent was held valid upon the

grPound that no power to determine as to the necessity of such
a continuation was thereby vested in the assignee but rather
such power was confeirred conditional upon the necessity to
be determined by the court; that the assig nee could not safely exerci-,e such power except under the order of the court
,Q )0

"

and in ca e he attempted migh 1 be restrained at any moment.

-- P.ROVISIO)NS AUTHORIZING THE AS IGNEF TO

COMPROMISE--

The validity of an assignment containing a provision
authorizing the assignee to compound or compromise debts and
dlmands due the creditors of the insolvent has been denied in
many states and was first questioned in this state in the early case of Grover v.

wx.:xxmuu*

a,

comix omise is

, Wakeman II Wend. 187.

ip,-nment is

to be conceded yai

If such an

, the trupt +o

-o be observed and enforced by the courts and

a delay for that purpose would therefore be justifiable by
tlP assignee.
one which

It is fIso apparent that such a

power is

if exercised must operate in favor of the assig-

2 3.

To compromise such debs implies that by so doing

nor.

the creditors will receive less than the amount of their
claims,

and the debtor's property of course going so much

farther in the payment of his debts, the ultimate result must
be that the more favorable compromises the as ignee mny succeed in eff ecting the more free the insolvent will be from
indebtedness upon the settlement of the estate.

Further,

the exercise of the power does not rest in the discretion of
the assipnee.

If it be valid, like all valid trusts, it

must be exercised by him and if it

bo compulsory

t

he duty of

the as-ignep would be to dic+,ate terms upon which the credIt

itors might share in the estate.

woiId virtually

give the assignee power to devlare future preferences which
ha

always been denied a

itors.

It it

in MJcConnell v.

prejudicial to the rights of cred-

clear therefore as is said by Danforth J.

Sherwood 84 N.Y.

523., "that it

cannot be spid

in such a case that the assifnor has devoted his p~roperty
absolutely and unconditionally to the paynent of his debts.
Compromise,

or an attempt at cornpromise may precede payment

and with either is

delay.

It seems evident therefore that

the intent was to delay the payment of the debts and create a
trust for the use of the assignor and either of these intents
both by the common law and by the statute is a fraud in the
face o f which the assignrment cannot

stand."
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On the other hand,
debts due to the assignor is

a power to corijound or corpromise
sustaine,- as a power to be exer-

cised by the assignee with a sound discre ion and in the interest of the trust.

Such power is construed to apply

only to doubtful or dangerous debts and to merely an affirmation of that portion of the genernl assignment act which
p~rr'ts

,he court to authorize such compromise.
Coyne v. Weaver 84 N.Y. 386 an

cases cit.-

ed.

--PREFERENCES.-It wou-dd be hardly proper in this connection to
elaborlate upon the doctrine of preferences in genrral.
The iniquities flowing from the recognition of the
doctrine which allows an insolvent debtor, who by his own
freei act has placed his property beyond the pursuit of his
creditors, at the same time to pay in full the claim of one
creditor to the utter exclusion of the remainder equally
worthy, has nt all times merited the strdngest condemnation of
muik wisest statesman and most enlightened jurists.
Courts of the highest authority, filled with pmxa
apparent unrest because compelled by precedeht to recognise
the l

ality of preferences, have ever been ready to

reproach
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the law for their existence.
Judicial disapprobation of the doctrine has been
constantly expressed in the strongest terms,

as cmntr'ary to

justice, honesty and morality;the root of all vice in assignments; to be vigilantly watched with the greatest of jealousy
and never to be regarded otherwise than in a spirit of toleration.
In Nicholson v. Leavitt 4 Sand. 252, Mr. Justice
Duer eqi)loyed the following emphatic language: "The preference
which leaves to those who remain only a faint hope and doubtful chance of a miserable D±li

dividend, we condemn as a

positive injustice and lament that the law has denied to us
the power of redressing the wrong.

We know that the custom

of Viving such preferences has extensively prevailed, and is
warranted in a measure by public opinion as well as by the
decisions of our courts; but we are not the less persuaded
that it is forbidden by public policy and is inconsistent
with a sound morality.

'

It is now the undoubted law

of this state and however serious may be the conviction of
judges, that, the allowance bf the practice tends to injustice
and tempts to fraud,
apply the remedy.

the legislature alone is compptent to
Until the existing law shall have been

altered by the national or state legislatures, our jurisprudence must remain liable to the reproach that we are the only
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nation in the civilized world, in which a merchant, knowing
or contemplating his insolvency is allowed to place his whole
property beyond the reach of' the body of hiscreditors by devoting its avails principally or exclusively to the satisfaction of the claims of a few."
Yet with this spirit of judicial discontent exhibited by nearly all of theeti ery state the right to prefer
has continued to be unwillingly tolerated in conformity to
precedent, until the legislatures of many states have either
totally swept away, or most essentially modified the privilege.
The kRcJ±k

legislature of this state have well

deeme3 it necessary to impose essential restrictions upon
this right.

Debts owing to employees for services are

preferr-ed by operation of law and a frther right of preference is given to the debtor of one third only of the residue
of the estate.

Limited partnerships and business corpora-

tions are expressely prohibited from making assignments containing preferences.
Expressions are to be found in many cases to the
effect that an assignment containing preferences will not
be tolerated unless it convey the whole of the debtor's property.

The weight of rT ent authority seems to indicate a

contrary jXJMRfwx* doctrine.
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In re Gordon 49 Hun 370,

and cases cited.

In that case Follett J., said,"The validity of an
assipment by an insolvent debtor of a part of his property
in trust for the benefit of a part of his creditors (no fraud
being intended)+ ++ ++ + must be regarded by this court as
settled. '
The debtor cannot defer the naming of the (preferred
creditors to a time subsequent to the making of the assignment.

Such a reservation of a right to name future pref-

erences will not be tolerated.

Neither can he leave the

selection of such preferred creditors to the discretion of
his, assignee.

The preferences must be named by the assig-

nor himself and must be clearly and explicitly expressed upon
the face of the assignment or must Pccompany it.

To per-

mit the assignor to subsequently name preferences or to delegate such power to the assignee would be to place the creditors in the power of the debtor and to compel them to acquiesce in such terms as he might *k

think proper to pres-

cribe as the only condition upon which they are to be permitted to share in the distribution of his property.

This

would be as is readily recognized, a fraud upon creditors
and would hinder and necessarily delay them in the collection
of their debts.
Maack v.1,aack 49 Hun507 and cases cited .

28.

The claims preferr-ed must be legal debts and liabilities.

If intentionally excessive or of fictitious claims

or mere moral obligations the assignment will be set aside,
such provisions,

it

being held evincing a fraudulent intent

on the part of the assignor.
Brown v. Haltead

17 Abb.N.C.

197.

Assig nments are frequently drawn containing a provision to the effect that the creditors shall execute a release of their claims to the debtor as a condition precedent
to their receiving any benefit under the assip,,nment,

or as a

condition of preference, or as a condition of sharing in the
surplus remaining after the payment of absolutely preferred
creditors.
Great conflict of opinion exists in the decisions
of the courts of the various states upon the validity of such
provisions and their effect upon the assignment of which they
form a part.

In some states such provisions have been

sustained to the extent of wholly excluding non-releasing
creditors; in other states they have been sanctioned only so
far as they 6perate to postpone non-releasing creditors to
others and in

some states, notably in -New York, they have

been pronounced, under all circumstances to be fraudulent
and absolutely void, invalidating the entire instrument.
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Such a power given to the creditors has been justly denounced
as coercive to their interests; as rigorous and unjust to
a tyrannical degree and as equivalent to legalizedlfraud.
The law never contemplated that by making an assignment the
debtor could escape liability for the ba!,-nce remaining due
his cieditors after an adminisIration of the assigned estate.
Such a coercive power would enable the insolvent to

Nx)=k

extort from his creditors an absolute discblrge from all
liability upon a part payment of his honest debts.

It

would enable the debtor to despotically dictate terms upon
which his creditors should be suffered to take whatever he
might choose to give them.

Assignents of this char-

acter if permitted would secure to the insolvent the power
in effect to enact a bankrupt law for himself.

It is well

determined that such assinments will not be sustained in
this stiate.
Grover v. WaI-eman II Vend. 187.

A discussion has been attem
1pted herein of the various general grounds apl arent from the face of +,he assignment
which will justify a judicial interference to the extent of
invalidating the entire conveyance.
MJany other p-rovisions of course might be inserted
which would affec, th

le ,'ality of

the instruinent but it

I
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is thought that an examination of those most frequently before the courts will be sufficient in This connection.
A discussion of these general grounds alone cannot
fail to suggest to the mind the great difficulty of drawing
an assigment which will bear the scrutiny of our coiir',s of
equity, whose tendency it

must be admitted is -- inst sus-

taining, this class of trusts.
The langpua 'e of the Vice Chancellor in Iitchf'ie!d
v. White 3 San(If.

554, in this relation is appropriate:

"The whole difficulty consists in the insertion of clauses
beyond,

or varying, the necessary provisions for transferr-

ing the debtor's property and appropriatin,: it
of his debts.

to the payment

We have never heard of a case, nor do we

believe there has ever been one decided in this sate in
which an assinrunent has been held fraudulent which simply
vested the debtor's estate in trustees, and directed them to
convert in into money and apply it

absolutely and ,ithout

resprve, to the payment of his debts, whether equally among
all the creditors or with preferences.

But so long as

failing debtors will make assiqunents containing provisions
directly or indirectly fur their own benefit to the detriment
of their' creditors, or vesting' in assignees the power of giving preferences or excluding creditors who will not release
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the debtor,

or exempting the --ssig:ne

f'om his proper legal

responsibilities to those for whom he is
wise dpviatin'

to act, or other-

froin the direc', ;pIroriation of the assets

to the payment of debts,
cured and applied;

so far

as they bn reasonably se-

so long it) will be the duty of the courts

to pronounce such assignments fraudulent whenever they
presented for adjudication.'

)re

